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CASE COMMENTS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: OVERBREADTH-A JURISPRUDENTIAL
DISAPPEARING ACT
Jones v. State, 293 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1974)
After appellant was arrested under Florida Statute section 847.05,' for
using indecent or obscene language, 2 he was searched and subsequently
arrested for possession of less than five grams of marijuana. At trial, appellant challenged the statute under which he was initially arrested, and the
resultant search and seizure of the marijuana. 3 The trial court upheld the
constitutionality of the statute and, in a jury trial, appellant was convicted
of possession only. On direct appeal,4 the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed
and HELD, Florida Statute, section 847.05 comes within constitutional
bounds of certainty and is not void for overbreadth because the language of
the statute is "sufficient to convey to a person of common understanding its
prohibition." 5
Both the Florida and federal7 constitutions provide protection for speech.
Those provisions, however, do not protect all speech. 8 As presently interpreted
by the United States Supreme Court, language classified as defamatory, 9
obscene,' 0 or that which is likely to cause an "immediate violent response"''
is outside the protected zone.
In order for the state to regulate and punish speech it is not sufficient
that the speech be properly classified as "unprotected." Laws proscribing
the use of such speech must clearly delineate the offense. 2 Certain tests
have been developed by the United States Supreme Court to determine
the validity of laws regulating unprotected speech because of a demonstrated
tendency on the part of such statutes to impair protected speech as well. Due
process of law requires that a person not be criminally punished under laws
1. "Any person who shall publicly use or utter any indecent or obscene language
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree ...." FLA. STAT. §847.05 (1973).
2. Appellant allegedly said, "G-D- Mother F-,
F- Pigs and Son of a B-."
293 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1974), appeal dismissed, 95 S.Ct. 671 (1974).
3. Had the trial court held the initial arrest unlawful, the subsequent search and
seizure would have been illegal as well, and evidence illegally seized is inadmissible at
trial. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Weiner v. Kelly, 82 So. 2d 155
(Fla. 1955); Gildrie v. State, 94 Fla. 134, 113 So. 704 (1927); State v. Mach, 187 So. 2d
918 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
4. FLA. CONsT. art. V, §3(b)(1) provides: "The supreme court: (1) Shall hear appeals
from final judgments of trial courts . . .passing on the validity of a state statute."
5. 293 So. 2d at 34 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
6. "No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech." FLA. CONST.
art. I, §4.
7. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CoNsr.
amend. I.
8. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
9. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
10. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
11. 405 U.S. at 528.
12. 293 So. 2d at 34.
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that fail to warn him of his liabilitys or create liabilities where they ought
not to be.1 4 Consequently, a statute may fail to meet constitutional standards
if the statutory language is so uncertain that a person of common understanding is unable to discern what conduct is prohibited, or if it prohibits
constitutionally protected rights regardless of the clarity of the language
employed. The former defect is classified as unconstitutionally vague' 5 and
the latter as unconstitutionally overbroad. 16 Each is defective from the start;
therefore, prosecutions cannot be sustained under them even where the conduct sought to be punished is not constitutionally protected.1 7 The Florida
supreme court, while recognizing and applying the vagueness test,", has
yet to test speech laws against the overbreadth doctrine.
In the instant case the Florida supreme court first considered whether the
appellant's words were obscene or indecent and found that they were.' 9 Although the court has often used this technique in construing laws of this nature, 20 the court's emphasis on the act of the appellant rather than on the
language of the statute seems misplaced. The United States Supreme Court
22
in Lewis v. City of New Orleans,21 a case posing a similar problem- completely ignored a determination of whether the alleged conduct was punishable. Instead, the court examined the terms of the ordinance, which was
found to be overbroad 2 3 and hence incapable of supporting a criminal
prosecution.24 The focus in that case was on the statute, not the individual.
In the instant case, after concluding that appellant's language was obscene, the Florida supreme court examined the language of the statute to
determine whether it was vague.25 The court thought the public had little
13. E.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
14. E.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 360 U.S. 479 (1965).
15. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
16. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 494 (1965); NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S.
288, 307 (1964); Medrano v. Allee, 347 F. Supp. 605, 621-22 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Overstock
Book Co. v. Barry, 305 F. Supp. 842, 851 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp.
938, 951-52 (N.D. Ill. 1968); People v. Dominick, 68 Misc. 2d 425, 429-31, 326 N.Y.S.2d
466, 472 (Erie County Ct. 1971).
17. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972) (quoting White, J., dissenting in
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 619 (1971)). The effect of the statute must be
taken into consideration when deciding the constitutionality of that statute. E.g., Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
18. E.g., Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971) (sodomy statute held tnconstitutionally vague).
19. 293 So. 2d at 33.
20. E.g., State v. Mayhew, 288 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1973); Bradshaw v. State, 286 So. 2d
4 (Fla. 1973); Witherspoon v. State, 278 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1973); State v. Magee, 259 So. 2d
139 (Fla. 1972).
21. 94 S. Ct. 970 (1974).
22. Appellant allegedly said, "G--- D-- Mother F-- Police." 94 S. Ct. at 973.
23. NEw ORLEANS ORDINANCE 828 MCS, §49-7 provides: "It shall be unlawful and a
breach of the peace for any person wantonly to curse or revile or to use obscene or
opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of the city police while
in the actual performance of his duties." 94 S. Ct. at 972.
24. 94 S. Ct. at 973.

25. 293 So. 2d at 34.
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difficulty understanding what the statute prohibited.2 6 At that point Justice
Ervin parted company with the majority: "Actually, the majority opinion is
little more than a parochial ipse dixit conclusion expressing personal prejudice that indecent language spoken in public in and of itself is a crime,
' 7
and may be condemned by vague legislation."
Assuming the court's conclusion that the statute is not vague, the fact
remains that all five justices appear to have missed the central issue, which
is whether Florida's obscene language statute, as written, prohibits protected
speech as well as unprotected speech. In other words, is the statute overbroad?28 Every reference to overbreadth in the opinion is followed by language
that reveals no distinction, in the mind of the court, between vagueness and
29
overbreadth.
Comparing similar statutes in other jurisdictions with the Florida statute
and the treatment they have received at the hands of the United States Su-preme Court, there exists a strong presumption that the Florida statute is
overbroad. Each statute30 and ordinance 31 examined by the court -was not
considered vague. Nevertheless, in each instance the area of prohibited
speech was not limited to words that were unprotected speech. 32 Each case
was remanded to the state court for a construction consistent with the national
standard.3 3
One of the cases, Lewis v. City of New Orleans,34 is particularly analogous
to the instant case. Appellant was clearly in violation of the ordinance,35
which the state court held to be valid.36 The United States Supreme Court
remanded the case to the Louisiana supreme court for a construction consistent with Gooding v. Wilson.37 When the Louisiana supreme court found
26.

Id.

27. Id. (Ervin, J., dissenting).
28. The oversight is especially surprising because counsel for the appellant amended

his original brief arguing both vagueness and overbreadth to argue overbreadth alone.
29. The court, while mentioning overbreadth, explains its holding in language long.

associated with the vagueness test: "[W]e therefore determine that the statute .. .is not
void for overbreadth . . .but to the contrary, contains language sufficient to convey to
a person of common understanding its prohibition." 293 So. 2d at 34 (emphasis added).
30. The New Jersey statute provides: "Any person who utters loud and offensive or pro-

fane or indecent language in any public street or other public place, public conveyance, orplace to -which the public is invited . . . [is a disorderly person]." N.J. STAT. ANN.
(1970). The Oklahoma statute provides: "If any person shall utter or-

§2A:170-29(l)

speak any obscene or lascivious language or word in any public place, or in the presence
of females, or in the presence of children under ten years of age, he shall be liable to

a fine of not more than one hundred dollars, or imprisonment for not more than thirty
days, or both."

tit. 21, §906 (1970).
MCS §49-7. See note 23 supra.
32. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972).
33. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S.
914 (1972); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972).
34. 94 S.Ct. 970 (1974).
35. See note 23 supra. 36. 263 La. 809, 269 So. 2d 450 (1972). 37. 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (Georgia abusive words statute found unconstitutionally overbroad).
31.

Nma

OKLA. STAT. ANN.

ORLEANS ORDINANCE 828
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nothing wrong with the wording of the ordinance, the United States Supreme
Court took jurisdiction once again and held that the ordinance was overbroad. 38
In the instant case the Florida supreme court has paralleled the error of
the Louisiana court. Although the appellant is in clear violation of the law
%asdrawn, and possibly in violation of a law properly drawn, the court
cannot fail to narrow an overbroad statute merely to ensure the conviction
of a person whose conduct is reprehensible. Focusing on the undesirable
conduct of appellant to the exclusion of meaningful consideration of the
unconstitutional sweep of the statute is a procedure that has been consistent39
ly rejected by the United States Supreme Court.

The holding of the Florida supreme court in the instant case effectively
nullifies an important statutory test. 40 Without aid in the future from either

the federal judiciary or the Florida supreme court itself, Florida courts will
be deprived of an important device to maintain the barrier between the
valid exercise of police power and unconstitutional encroachment.
RONALD A. NELSON

38. 94 S. Ct. 970 (1974). Brennan, J., speaking for the Court: "[W]e find nothing in
the opinion of the Louisiana Supreme Court that makes any meaningful attempt to
limit . . . any . . . term in [the statute]. In that circumstance it is immaterial whether the
words appellant used might be punishable under a properly limited statute." Id. at 972.
39. See, e.g., 94 S. Ct. 970 (1974); 408 U.S. 914 (1972); 408 U.S. 901 (1972).
40. The United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari in the instant case, Jones v.
Florida, 95 S. Ct. 671 (1974). thus letting stand the Florida court's holding. The appeal was
dismissed for want of a properly presented federal question, although the majority did not
indicate what the precise infirmity of the petition was. Three justices dissented strongly from
the denial of certiorari (Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, J.J.). In his dissent, Justice Brennan
said: "Appellant has properly presented the federal question decided by the Florida
Supreme Court and our plain duty is to reverse that court and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion." Id. at 672.
It can only be conjectured that the Court refused review out of a desire to limit the
caseload of the Court, reasoning that there is already enough precedent in the field to
guide state courts even though the Florida court has apparently failed to follow such
precedent. The dissenting Justices clearly believed the Supreme Court of Florida had erred:
"Section 847.05 punishes only spoken words and, as construed by the Florida Supreme
Court, is facially unconstitutional because not limited in application 'to punish only unprotected speech' but is 'susceptible of application to protected expression.' Gooding V.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972). . . . Gooding obviously compels reversal of the judgment of
the Florida supreme court." Id. at 671 (Brennan. J., dissenting).
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